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CHANGING ROLES OF
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
GEORGE F. BREAK
University of California, Berkeley
A time of fiscal stress and of great uncertainty about the future seems
an appropriate moment in which to assess once again the changing
roles of different levels of government in this country during the past
sixty years or so. Those years were hardly tranquil ones, and whatever
certainties shaped them have become evident only in retrospect. Such
clues, therefore, as analyses of past trends can provide to the mysteries
of our own time should be carefully weighed even though the fiscal
problems confronting us seem to be of unprecedented proportions. By
looking backward the present paper attempts to determine where we
are and where we appear to be going with the U.S. federal system of
government. Section I discusses the broad picture as it is revealed by a
selected group of expenditure measures computed from Bureau of the
Census (BOC) and National Income Accounts (NIA) data for four
past periods—1902 to 1966, 1927—29 to 1966, 1940 to 1966, and
1948 to 1966. Section II analyzes the major factors that appear to
have accounted for the changes observed in the first section, and Sec-
tion III concentrates on those more current developments that seem to
be making for change in the near future. Section IV summarizes the
conclusions reached.
I. The Broad Picture
Between 1902 and 1966, when the expenditures of all levels of govern-
ment were growing at average annual rates of between 7 and 81/2 per
cent, depending on the specific concept used in measuring them, both
federal and state shares expanded at the expense of local governments.
In Table 1six alternative expenditure measures, based on published
Bureau of the Census data, have been arranged in descending order of
scope, and for each series the percentage shares of the three levels of164 The Analysis of Public Output
TABLE 1
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EXPENDITURE SHARESa
SHOWN BY SIX ALTERNATIVE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
MEASURES OF AGGREGATE GOVERNMENTAL
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SOURCES: Series 1: 1902—48 from Tax Foundation, Facts and Figures on Gov-
ernment Finance, 1967, New York, 1967, p. 20. 1965—66 computed from data
given in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1965—66, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1967. Series 2—6: Appendix Table A.
a Percentages of total expenditures made by each of the three levels of gov-
ment.
b For definitions of the alternative measures see text.
°F=federal;S =state;Llocal.
government are shown for the five years selected for discussion in this
section. These six series do not, of course, represent all of the possible
choices, but they do illustrate the problems involved in choosing a few
broad measures to show past trends in expenditure shares, and these
problems will be discussed in the process of deriving the 1902—66
picture.
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Total governmental expenditures, as defined by the Bureau of the
Census, include the costs of water, electric, gas and transit systems that
are owned and operated by local governments (utility expenditures),
the costs of liquor stores operated by state and local governments, and
the benefit payments of governmental insurance trust systems.' The
first two of these inclusions raise fundamental questions concerning the
proper definition of governmental activities which are too complex to be
discussed here at length,2 and the last one involves tax-transfer opera-
tions, which shift command over resources among different groups in
the private sector rather than between that sector and the government.
This last distinction is an important one and easily warrants separate
treatment of resource-using and transfer expenditures in the measure-
ment of federal-state-local expenditure shares. In addition, the dividing
line between government owned and operated public utilities and liquor
stores and similar enterprises that are privately owned and operated
under close governmental supervision seems an especially thin one.
For these reasons the Census Bureau total expenditure series (series 1
in Table 1) is rated here as too broad to serve as a basic measure of
the changing roles of different levels of government. It is worth noting,
nevertheless, that of all the Table 1 measures, series 1 shows the great-
est 1902—66 increase in the importance of the federal expenditure share
(a rise of nearly 90 per cent), though it does not usually show the
highest federal share in any given year. It should also be noted that
intergovernmental expenditures3 are included in the share of the grantor,
but that intergovernmental revenues, as inall of our own-financed
series, are deducted from the expenditures of the recipient in order to
1Insurancetrust activities include both contributory retirement systems for
public employees and governmental social insurance and life insurance programs.
Social insurance provides protectionagainst economic hazards arising from
disability, death, accident, illness, and unemployment. The administrative costs
of these programs are defined as general, rather than as insurance trust, expendi-
tures. See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments:
1962, Vol. VI, No. 4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Em-
ployment, Washington, D. C., 1964, p. 3. Hereafter cited as Historical Statistics:
COG, 1962.
2Fora useful survey of the issues involved see C. Lowell Harriss, 'Govern-
ment Expenditures: Significant Issues of Definition," Journal of Finance, Vol.
IX, December 1954, pp. 351—64.
Intergovernmental expenditure is defined as "amounts paid to other govern.
ments as fiscal aid in the form of shared revenues and grants-in-aid, as reimburse-
ments for performance of general government activities and for specific services
for the paying government,...orin lieu of taxes. Excludes amounts paid to
other governments for purchase of commodities, property, or utility services, any
tax imposed or paid as such, and employer contributions for social insurance."
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Compendium of State Government Finances in 1965,
Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 55.166 The Analysis of Public Output
show the spending of each level that is financed from its own sources.
The second series in Table 1, own-financed general expenditures,
excludes utility, liquor store, and insurance trust operations, but includes
other commercial-type public enterprises, such as airports, housing
projects, toll highways and the U.S. Postal Service. The latter group
does appear to include enterprises whose public purposes are rela-
tively more pronounced, but they are still a diverse lot, and it is not
easy to define a simple, uniform measure that will accurately show the
importance of their public activities. Whereas the Census Bureau treats
them on a gross basis, including total costs on the expenditure side of
the accounts and total revenues on the receipts side, the national income
accounts use the net basis, subtracting revenues from costs and show-
ing only net expenditures (positive or negative) on the output side of
the accounts.4 Neither procedure is entirely satisfactory. A public hous-
ing project, for example, exists to raise the real living standards of the
poor, but gross government expenditures overestimate the extent of
the government's intervention in private economic affairs, and NIA net
expenditures will typically underestimateThe difficulties are both
conceptual and statistical, and it is by no means clear that their resolu-
tion would be worth the effort. In the meantime, it is advantageous to
have alternative expenditure series that treat public enterprises on both
a net and a gross basis, and the governmental roles shown by NIA and
BOC data should be interpreted with these differences in mind.
The second and third series in Table 1 differ only in their treatment
ofintergovernmentalexpendituresandrevenues.Whereas own-
financed general expenditures, as already noted, assign the expenditure
weights to the level of government that does the financing rather than
In the NIA framework the operating surplus or deficit (sales receipts minus
all current operating costs other than interest payments and depreciation charges)
of government enterprises is consolidated with direct business subsidies on the
output side of the government sector, and the capital expenditures of public
enterprises are combined with other government purchases of goods and services.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, National
Income: 1954 Edition, Washington, D.C., 1954, pp. 49 and 148. A list of federal
enterprises and of the major types of state and local enterprises is given on p. 66
of the same publication.
Over the lifetime of the project, NIA expenditures will equal the amount of
the original capital investment plus the sum of the annual operating deficits.
Since the latter exclude both interest payments on borrowed capital and an im-
puted rate of return on owned capital, the total NIA expenditure figure will un-
derestimate the subsidy given to the housing occupants, though in any given year
fluctuations in government investment and in private rates of return to landlords
might produce the opposite result.
IC-
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to the level that actually provides the benefits to the private sector
of the economy, direct general expenditures do the reverse.6 Comparing
the two measures, therefore, one may note the fairly stable importance
of state-to-local intergovernmental financing (reflected in the larger
state share of own-financed general expenditures) and the rapidly
increasing importance of federal grants-in-aid. Further analysis of
these developments is given in Section IL
The final three measures shown in Table 1all focus on the civil
functions of U.S. governments. Here again one encounters conceptual
and statistical difficulties that cannot be satisfactorily resolved. As a
result two alternative measures are provided. The two series marked
C-I (numbers 4 and 5 in Table 1) incorporate a relatively broad
conception of federalcivilactivities by excluding only the BOC
measure of federal expenditures for national defense and interna-
tional affairs.7 Many would feel, however, that some account should
be taken of the indirect costs of past wars, and one way of doing this,
used by James A. Maxwell and others,8 is used in series C-Il (number
6 in Table 1). In it federal civil expenditures are defined to exclude
not only defense and international expenditures but also interest pay-
ments on general debt and the costs of veterans' services not allocated
by the Census Bureau to other functional categories.9 Clearly, not all
federal debt can be attributed to past and current wars, nor can it be
determined what share of veterans' expenditures represents payments
6Inthedirectgeneral measure, in other words, intergovernmental expenditures
are excluded from the expenditures of the grantor, and intergovernmental
revenues are not deducted from the expenditures of the grantee.
A still broader concept could, of course, be provided by excluding military
expenditures alone.
See, for example, Maxwell, Financing State and Local Governments, Wash-
ington, DC., 1965, p.14.
9In1965—66 total federal expenditures on veterans' services of $6,711 million




Insurance trust expenditures 572
Direct general expenditures: total 6,123
education 336
public welfare 38
health and hospitals 1,239
not elsewhere classified 4,510
It is the last figure shown that is excluded in the derivation of series C-Il.
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for past services rendered or injuries incurred rather than benefits
that the federal government would have provided in any case.
Our civil expenditure series, therefore, are necessarily based on
some arbitrary distinctions, and while these are no better than a
number of other alternatives, they do have the virtue of being subject
to statistical measurement over long periods of time. As expected, the
federal shares shown by the three civil expenditure measures are
significantly below that level's share of total expenditures. Moreover,
these differences were notably wider at the end of the period than they
were at the beginning. This may be seen in the following tabulation
of expenditure share differentials, computed by subtracting federal
civil shares from federal shares of the corresponding total expenditure
series.
Federal Share Differentials:




Series c-i 7 4 4 15 17
Direct general, Series c-i 8 4 5 17 20
Direct general, Series c-u 18 16 10 31 28
Developments during the other periods shown in Table 1 can be
summarized briefly. The 1927—66 period shows the same picture of
rising shares for both federal and state governments as occurred from
1902 to 1966. Between 1940 and 1966, on the other hand, federal
shares of civil expenditures fell while federal shares of total expendi-
tures rose.
Absolute Changes in Expenditure Shares, 1 940—66
Higher Federal Share Lower Federal Share
OFTE F +15 OFGE: c-i F —4
S —5 S +4
L —10 L 0
OFGE F +9 DGE: c-i F —8
S —2 S +5
L —6 L +3
DOE F +7 DGE: c-u F —11
S 0 S +7
L —8 L +4
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Finally, from 1948 to 1966 the federal share of all six Table 1 series
fell, the greatest relative declines occurring in the three civil expendi-
ture measures, but with direct general expenditures showing a nine-
point reduction that almost matched them. In each case both state
and local shares rose, the largest being in direct general civil expendi-
tures, series I, and the smallest in own-financed total expenditures.1°
TABLE 2
FEDERAL AND STATE-LOCAL SHARESa OF SIX
NATIONAL-INCOME-ACCOUNTS MEASURES
OF AGGREGATE GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY,






























































































SOURCE: Appendix Table B. Civil purchase shares for 1903 were computed
from data on nonwar federal, and total state-local, payrolls and purchases given
in Solomon Fabricant, TheTrend of Government Activity in the United States
Since 1900, NewYork, NBER, 1952, pp. 225—34.
a Percentages of total activity accounted for by each level of government.
b For definitions of the alternative measures see text.
C F =federal;SL =state-local.
d Figures are for 1903.
e F-M =federal,military; F-C =federal,civilian; SL =state-local.
'° Before rounding, the state share of own-financed total expenditures rose
from 17.3 per cent in 1948 to 17.4 in 1965-66.170 The Analysis of Public Output
Much the same broad picture is shown by the six NIA series pre-
sented in Table 2. Note, for example, the consistent increase in state-
local shares between 1948 and 1966 as well as the substantial fall in
those shares between either 1902 or 1929 and each of the following
three years shown. The one notable exception is the series for civil
purchases of goods and services (item 4 in Table 2). From 1939 on,
this measure was derived by excluding official estimates of national
defense purchases from total federal purchases of goods and services,
and for 1903 Fabricant's estimates of nonwar payrolls and purchases
were used.'1 Though the two figures are not strictly comparable, it
seems unlikely that the required adjustment would convert the slight
increase in the state-local share shown between 1903 and 1966 into a
substantial decline. Also impressive is the large 1948—66 decline in the
federal share of civil purchases.
A final point of interest concerns the behavior during the 1929—66
period of the major types of governmental expenditure distinguished
in the national income accounts. It will be noted in Table 2 that
whereas in 1966 own-financed total expenditures were divided approxi-
mately two-to-one between the federal and state-local levels respec-
tively, purchases of goods and services were split exactly 50-50. Two
main factors account for this gap. The first is federal aid which keeps
the own-financed expenditures of state and local governments below
their direct expenditures. The allocation of the latter is shown in Table
3, and it will be noted that though in 1929 the impact of federal aid on
spending shares was minor, by 1940 it had shifted a 54-46 division of
own-financed expenditures to one of 49-51 for direct expenditures,
and by 1966 the gap between these two series had increased to 7
points.
The second explanatory factor is the division between the two levels
of government of net interest paid and of transfer payments to per-
sons. As Table 3 shows, these two series have in recent years been
dominated by the federal government, and in each of the benchmark
years selected for discussion in this section federal use of resources,
reflected in the Table 2 series on government purchases, has been con-
siderably lower,relativeto state and local governments, thanits
participation in programs designed to shift command over resources
from one private group to another. Further aspects of this important
difference are discussed in the next two sections.
"Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the United States
Since 1900, New York, NBER, 1952, pp. 214—35.
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TABLE 3
FEDERAL AND STATE-LOCAL NIA EXPENDITURE















































SotnkcEs: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, The
National Income andProductAccounts of the United States, 1929—1 965, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1966, and Surveyof Current Business, July1967.
a Omitted are purchases of goods and services which are shown in Table 2.
b All expenditures except federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments.
CF=federalshare; SLstate-local share.
d All expenditures except grants-in-aid and purchases of goods and services.
II. Changing Functional Shares
In this section our discussion of the changing roles of different levels
of government shifts from broad aggregates to specific functions of
particular significance. These have been divided into three categories:
(1) those functions which by their nature are suited only to the
federal government, (2) those functions whose cost appears to be
especially sensitive to the urbanization process, and (3) public expen-
ditures for the maintenance and development of human capital which
have reacted in important ways to the technological, communications,
and transportation revolutions of the last quarter century.
Federal and Non federal Functions
For purposes of discussion here a relatively conservative definition of
federal functions has been adopted. Included in that category are only
4172 The Analysis of Public Output
five program areas whose assignment to the national government
seems beyond dispute: national defense, international relations, space
research and technology, veterans' services and benefits, and postal
services. No implication that these should be the only federal functions
is intended—indeed, far from it—but it seems useful to treat this
group separately and to compare its rate of growth over specific periods
with that of all other governmental expenditures. The relevant data
are given in Tables 4, 5, and 6.
TABLE 4
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATESa OF FEDERAL AND
NONFEDERAL EXPENDITURES DURING SELECTED
PERIODS, 1902—66

















1902—13 3% 2 7% 4% 6%
1913—27 6% 8% 7% 7% 10
1927—36 4% 13 ½ 6% 4
1936—40 14 —26 1% —3% 5%
1940—48 33 26 10 28 8½
1948—56 13 —% 6% 11 8
1956—62 3% 5 6 4%b 8%
1962—66 3½ 2% 8% 5b 6%
1965—66 9 7½ 8½ 9%b 9
1902—66 9%c 5% 6 8½b 7½
Souxca: Computed from data given in Appendix Table D.
aRatesare compound annual rates of growth expressed to the nearest % per
cent for rates under 10 per cent and to the nearest 1 per cent for all others.
b Includes expenditures on space research and technology which began in 1958
at $89 million, increased to $1,242 in 1962 and to $5,869 million in 1966. These
increases represent average annual growth rates of over 90 per cent and 47
per cent respectively.
Military functions alone, which are shown separately by the Bureau of the
Census, increased at 9% per cent per annum between 1902 and 1966 while the
remaining national defense and international functions rose at an average rate of
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TABLE 6 is
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATESa OF DEFENSE AND aq
NONDEFENSE GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF GOODS on










1939—48 27 6¾ 10
1948—56 18 8 12
1956—62 4¾ 9½ 7
1962—66 4 9½ 7
19641v_19671vb 15 10 12
1966—67 20 11 14
1939—67 16 8 9%
SouRcEs: Computed from data given inTheNational Income and Product Ac-
counts of the United States, 1929—1 965 andthe Surveyof Current Business, July
1967 and February 1968, Table 1.1.
Rates are compound annual rates of growth expressed to the nearest %
percent for rates under 10 per cent and to the nearest 1 per cent for all others.
b Fourth quarter seasonally adjusted data at annual rates.
Forthe entire period under study, as shown in the last line of
Table 4, national defense and international expenditures grew more
rapidly than nonfederal spendng, while veterans' benefits and postal
services grew less rapidly. The defense and international functions
were sufficiently important, however, to hold the growth rateof
federal expenditures well above that of nonfederal spending. The
result was strong upward pressure on federal expenditure shares for
the period as a whole and for the three subperiods 1927—36, 1940—56,
and 1965—66. However, during the early part of the century, in the
later years of the Great Depression, and between the Korean and
Vietnamese Wars the growth of federal functions tended to lag behind
the expansion of other governmental expenditures. Much the same
picture of the last decade is given by the NIA data in Table 5. Two of
the components of federal expenditures, however, are measured differ-
ently, and it will be noted that the NIA series for veterans' benefits
increased less rapidly than the BOC measure and that the NIA postal
deficit also grew less rapidly than did BOC gross postal expenditures.
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is narrowed from total expenditures to government purchases of goods
D
and services and from federal functions to national defense programs
only.'2 As Table 6 shows, all of the same features remain. The period
1939—56 exhibits a very rapid, and 1956—66 a relatively slow, growth
in defense purchases, but after late 1965 defense purchases again
outpaced other resource-using government programs.
The High-Cost Urban Functions
With the increasing urbanization of the country during this century—
the proportion of the population living in metropolitan areas rose
from 42 per cent in 1900 to 50 per cent in 1920, to 60 per cent in
1950, and to nearly 65 per cent in 1965—one might expect those
- governmentalfunctions that are especially costly to perform in urban
areas to grow at above-average rates, and by doing so to help sustain
local government expenditure shares. Such has not been the case, how-
ever. Five important local functions involved much higher per capita
4c- expendituresin 1962 in metropolitan than in nonmetropolitan areas, as
Wy Table 7 shows, but taken as a group they grew at barely 6% per cent
TABLE 7
LOCAL DIRECT GENERAL EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA:
RATIOS OF METROPOLITAN TO NONMETROPOLITAN
of AREAS, 1962
re
High-Cost Functions Other Major Functions
Housing and urban renewal 5.52 Libraries 1.86
Parks and recreation 3.73 Health 1.73
Fire protection 2.75 Public welfare 1.70
Sewerage and sanitation 2.51 Hospitals 1.32




Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, Metropolitan America: Fiscal
Patterns and Governmental Systems, New York, 1967, p. 74.
12 Another advantage is that the relevant NIA data are available over a longer
period of time, 1939—67 for the purchase series rather than only 1952—66 for the
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per annum, on the average, between 1902 and 1966. Though not a
low absolute rate, 61/2 per cent is below the growth rate of other local
expenditures. As a result the five urban functions began the century at
20 per cent of total local spending, receded to 15 per cent in the 1930's,
and were not far above that level in 1966.
Expenditures on High-Cost Urban Functions as a Per Cent of
Local General Expenditures
Year Per Cent YearPer Cent
1902 19.4 1948 17.9
1913 18.0 1957 17.2
1927 16.0 1962 17.4
1934 14.8 1966 16.5
1938 14.8
SOURCES: Historical Statistics: COG, 1962, p.47and Governmental Finances
in 1965-46, pp. 22—23.
It is not in these functional areas, it would appear, that one is likely to
find much support for local expenditure shares in the future.
Human Capital Expenditures
Expenditures for the maintenance and development of human capital,
on the other hand, are a predominately local function that has rather
consistently outpaced other nonfederal public programs, as Table 8
shows. At the same time, in an increasingly mobile and interrelated
communicative society there are compelling reasons for moving both
the financing and at least some of the control of human capital pro-
grams to higher levels of government. In such a society the benefits of
those programs are no longer highly localized, and the quality of their
services consequently becomes a matter of considerable federal and
state concern." The extent to which this concern has already affected
the relative roles of the three levels of government, and the potential
impact of further developments along the same lines is the subject of
this section.
If we look first at the provision of services, as shown by BOC
direct general expenditure shares in Table 9, we note that in general the
expected upward shift has occurred, but with some important excep-
C
13Fora discussion of the intergovernmental aspects of these developments see
George F. Break, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1967, Chapter 3.Changing Roles of Government 177
TABLE 8
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATESa OF EDUCATION,
WELFARE, HEALTH, AND NONFEDERAL DIRECT












1902—13 7% 3 5% 6%
1913—27 10 7% 10 10
1927—36 ½ 22 3½ 4
1936—40 4½ 7 5½ 5¾
1940—48 13 6¾ 13 8%
1948—56 8 5 8% 8
1956—62 8¼ 8¾ 8% 8%
1962—66 11 8 8 6%
1902—66 8 8% 8 7½
1927—66 7¾ 10 8 6%
1948—66 8% 6% 8% 7%
SOURCE: Computed from data given in Appendix Table D.
aRatesare compound annual rates of growth expressed to the nearest ¾ per
cent for rates under 10 per cent and to the nearest 1 per cent for all others.
tions. In education the state share has risen, and the local share
declined, fairly steadily during the present century, but the federal
share has fluctuated widely, being currently below the 7 per cent level
that prevailed just prior to World War II and again in 1956, and well
below the 25—30 per cent levels during the late nineteen-forties.14
Public welfare programs have also shifted upward from local to state
governments, but the federal share has declined both from its Great
Depression peaks and from the levels prevailing in the first three
decades of the century. Health and hospital operation, in contrast, has
14 Within the education category the operation of local schools, of course, has
remained in the local sector—BOC direct general expenditure shares moving
only from 0-0-100 in 1902 to 0-1-99 in 1966—while the operation of public
institutions of higher learning has shifted from state to local governments. In
1952, for example, the state-local shares of direct expenditures on higher educa-
tion were 93-7, and by 1965—66 they had become 88-12.
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TABLE 9
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL SHARES OF DIRECT
GENERAL EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION, WELFARE
AND HEALTH AND HOSPITALS,














































































SOURCE: Appendix Table C.
aF=federal;S =state;Llocal.
b Less thanper cent.
become much more of a federal responsibility, with the state and local
shares declining correspondingly but remaining about equal to each
other.
The upward shift in the financing, as distinct from the operation,
of human capital public programs has been both more pronounced
and more sustained. When federal and state intergovernmental expendi-
tures in these areas are related to state-local and local human capital
expenditures respectively, the picture that emerges is one that inter-
sperses periods of increasing centralization of financing with periods
of relative stability. Federal aid to education, for example, rose from
a level of barelypercent of state-local expenditures during the first
quarter of this century to nearly 8 per cent in 1948, remained close to
5 per cent from 1952 to 1962 and then rose again to 9 per cent in













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.180 The Analysis of Public Output
about 25 per cent of state-local expenditures on those functions in all
of the years shown in Table 10 between 1944 and 1960 but rose
modestly thereafter to 31 per cent by 1966.
Similar alternating intervals of expansion and stability characterized
the role of state assistance in local human capital programs. Note in
Table 10 the rapid rise in state educational grants between 1932 and
1944 and again between 1962 and 1966; the substantial expansion in
the financing role of state welfare grants from 1927 to 1938, 1948 to
1952, and 1962 to 1966; and finally, the 1944—57 increase in health
and hospital assistance that tended to be sustained through 1966.
TABLE 11
FEDERAL AND STATE-LOCAL SHARES OF OWN-
FINANCED AND DIRECT GENERAL EXPENDITURES
ON SELECTED FUNCTIONS, 1902 AND 1965-66
n.a. =notavailable.
(PER CENT)
SovitcEs: Computed from data given in Historical
Governmental Finances in 1965—66.
a F =federalshare; SL =state-localshare.
Statistics, COG 1962, and
b In the earliest available year, 1934, the F-SL shares of own-financed and












































Natural resources excluding farm F n.a. 70 47 67
price support programs SLna. 30 53 33Changing Roles of Government 181
The result of these relative increases in the importance of inter-
governmental assistance was the creation of substantial gaps between
own-financed and direct general expenditure shares in the health,
education and welfare area. Perhaps the most dramatic contrast shown
in Table 11 is the virtual cutting in half of the state-local share of
own-financed welfare expenditures (from 88 per cent to 46 per cent)
between 1902 and 1966 while the operation of welfare programs
remained almost completely in state-local hands. Federal financing of
health and hospitals presumably also increased materially, though full
data are available only since 1934, but neither that area nor education
matched theshiftin highway financing from complete state-local
responsibility in 1902 (and 1913) to a %—%federal-state/localdivi-
sion in 1966.
Finally,itis of interest to compute the hypothetical impact on
expenditure shares of a rather radical change in the financing of the
nation's 1965—66 human capital programs. If, for example, welfare
expenditures were to be financed, as some have suggested, entirely by
the federal government, if the division of health and hospital costs were
to be exactly reversed from its present one-third federal and two-thirds
state and localallocation,ifeducation expenditures were to be
financed equally by the two levels of government, and if all this were
to be done without changing the current levels of expenditure on the
three program areas, the impact on government roles could be sum-
marized as follows:
Expenditure Shares
Series Actual 1965—66 Hypothetical 1965—66
F SL F SL
Own-financed expenditures on
health, education and welfare 22 78 60 40
Own-financed general expenditures 63 37 73 27
Own-financed general expenditures
for civil purposes, I 46 54 60 40
While future increases in the financing role of the federal government
can be forecast with some confidence, it seems most unlikely that they
would occur in the manner just described. Some more probable possi-
bilities are discussed in the next section.182 The Analysis of Public Output
III. Current and Prospective Developments
Like the country as a whole, intergovernmental fiscal relations appear
to be in the midst of a period of accelerating change. As a result of
incentives from above and pressure from below, new levels of local
government are in the offing, promising to add further complexities to
the intergovernmental picture. Pointing in the same direction is a
strong, and probably increasing, interest in the use of tax, rather than
expenditure,incentivesto accomplish public purposes, and most
uncertain of all are the roles that the different levels of government
would play in a post-Vietnamese world that would permit a major
functional reallocation of fiscal resources. These three current and
prospective developments will be discussed in that order.
New Levels of Local Government
Among the major challenges to the U.S. federal system in the next few
years, it now seems clear, will be the formation of more rational and
effective systems of local government. While the solution of some of
the most important urban problems requires integrated, areawide
policy action, groups with special tastes and needs for public services
are primarily concerned with local autonomy. What seems to be
needed is some magic blend of centralizing and decentralizing changes
that will create simultaneously both larger and smaller units of local
government than any that now exist.
The federal government, throughitsgrant-in-aid programs,is
already providing a strong stimulus to the first line of development.
Financial support is now available for the formation of comprehensive
metropolitan planning agencies, bonus grants can be obtained for
projects that are carried out by regional (interstate or interlocal)
agencies, and the trend in urban development grants is to require the
aided project either to be part of a comprehensive, areawide plan or to
be reviewed by such a planning agency. Mainly enacted by the 88th
and 89th Congresses (1963—66), these incentives were incorporated
in federal grant programs with fiscal 1967 expenditures of nearly $2.8
billion and a projected two-year growth rate of over 50 per cent
(Table 12).
Whether federal financial assistance, together with local recognition
of the gains to be realized by dealing with regional problems on aChanging Roles of Government
TABLE 12
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rural water and waste disposal facilities c,f 11 34
Department of Transportation:
federal-aid highways in urban areas with
over 50,000 population c 2,154 3,336
Department of Commerce:
economic development assistance c,f,i 20 151
of Health, Education, and Welfare:
regional medical programs f 3 35
comprehensive health planning and services c,f — 110
air pollution control i 31 80
urban and industrial health c,f 17 33
Department of the Interior:
water pollution control c,i 99 191
Water Resources Council:
comprehensive regional planning f 2 3
Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment:
urban renewal c 370 700
urban transportation assistance c,f 42 150
urban planning grants f,i 22 46
basic water and sewer facilities c 6 130
open space land and urban beautification c 19 60
model city grants c,f,i — 242
neighborhood facilities c 1 32
metropolitan development incentive grants f,i — 3
Total 2,797 5,336
SouRcEs: TheBudget of theUnited States Government, Fiscal Year 1969 and
Special Analyses, Budgetof theUnited States,Fiscal Year 1969, Special
Analysis K.
ac=compatibilityrequired with comprehensive plan.
f =financialassistance to comprehensive planning authorities.
=incentivegrants for projects carried out by comprehensive regional or
metropolitan agencies.
rr
184 The Analysis of Public Output
regional basis, will result in the creation of a new level of metropolitan
governments, with their own revenue-raising powers and jurisdiction
over an appropriate set of areawide public programs, is far from clear.
Prominent among the possible harbingers of such a development is
the growing group of metropolitan councils of governments which
began in 1954 in Detroit with that area's Supervisors' Inter-County
Committee. Formation of these voluntary regional councils of elected
local officials was subsequently stimulated by the provision of federal
financial assistance in 1965 and by the requirement after mid-1967
that applications for federal aid for specified urban development proj-
ects be accompanied by the review and comments of an areawide
body authorized to carry out comprehensive planning for the metro-
politan area in question.'5 Though over thirty councils of governments
were operating in late 1967, their powers and sources of funds were
strictly limited, and in evaluating their future prospects the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) stated:
There is no real prospect that the associations of local govern-
ments are destined to become "super governments" or metropolitan
governments in the classic sense. Rather they appear to be develop-
ing, first into the planning phase of cooperative decision-making, and
second into a limited, step-by-step realization that it is better for local
governments cooperatively to program and implement decisions than
to turn regional affairs over to a series of legally and financially
autonomous special districts over which elected officials in a region
have little, or no, control.'6
Another form of regional government that has received a good deal
of attention from the experts is the areawide financing district. This
might be restricted to a single function, such as schools, for which it
might levy and collect an areawide property tax," or it might be a
general-purpose agency that imposed, say, a supplement on the state
sales tax or levied a surcharge on the state income tax returns of all
metropolitan residents and then distributed the proceeds to the differ-
ent urban governments according to some agreed-upon formula. It is
15 Section 70 1(g) grants authorized by the Housing and Development Act of
1965 (PL 89-117) and Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966 (PL 89-754), respectively.
16 ACIR, Metropolitan Councils of Governments, Report M-32, August 1966,
p. 30.
'7 As a result of its 1966—67 study of fiscal balance in the American federal
system the ACIR recommended that states authorize such regional school prop-
erty taxing districts. See their Ninth Annual Report, Washington, D.C., 1968,
p. 21.
AChanging Roles of Government 185
not easy to obtain such agreement in normal times, but that may not
be much of a barrier in future years.
At the opposite end of the local government spectrum is another
phenomenon of great current interest—neighborhood subunitsof
existing public agencies. In order to bring its public services more in
line with the tastes of its different citizens groups, San Francisco, for
example, has recently been discussing both miniboards of education
for individual schools within its large consolidated school district and
mini police stations to improve people-to-government relations in the
poorer areas of the city. Perhaps the boldest move in the decentraliza-
tion direction is that proposed for New York City by the Bundy
Report, which would establish sixty or so largely autonomous school
districts within the metropolitan region.'8 The development of neigh-
borhood service centers, supported by federal grants that are expected,
as Table 12 shows, to grow rapidly between 1967 and 1969, is another
manifestation of the same pressures for more responsive and more
responsible local government.
The local government sector, in short,is in a state of flux, the
duration and outcome of which cannot now be foreseen. On the one
hand, only a relatively minor restructuring of the system may result,
in which case it seems reasonable to predict that state and federal
expenditure shares will tend to expand at the expense of local, at least
for programs that have significant benefit spilouts to regional and
national levels. On the other hand, autonomous metropolitan and
regional governments may be formed either to help finance traditional
units of government or to deal with problems that transcend their
boundaries, and the traditional entities may also establish sets of sub-
units with some independent powers to deal with programs generating
benefits that are highly localized and servicing groups with distinct and
diverse tastes.'9 Should this be the case, one would expect to observe
a more vigorous, and relatively more important, local public sector,
though one whose structure might differ sufficiently from that of the
past to require future analysts of governmental roles to recognize more
than one distinct level within the local sector.2°
See Reconnection for Learning—A Community School System for New York
City, Report of the Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New
York City Schools, 1967.
'9 On this point see the highly suggestive, theoretical model developed by
Charles M. Tiebout in "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, Vol. 64, October 1956, pp. 416—24.
20 The mere establishment of intergovernmental regional authorities or neigh-
borhood subunits does not, of course, mean that a new level of government has
come into being. The crucial questions concern the amounts of independent
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Tax Credits and Subsidies
When a government wishes to stimulate private activities that generate
important social benefits, it normally can choose between expenditure
and tax subsidies for its purposes. Each alternative has its own dis-
tinctive merits, but what concerns us here is the impact of the choice
on the measurement of the expenditure shares of different levels of
government. In principle, there should be none, but in practice there
may be effects that are difficult to eradicate. For some measures of
governmental activity, and this is one of their advantages, there would
be no problem. Federal and state-local shares of NIA purchases of
goods and services, for example, would not be affected by the choice,
on the part of either level of government, of tax, rather than expendi-
ture, subsidies. Total expenditure shares, on the other hand, would
change unless an explicit adjustment were made. Suppose, to take a
hypothetical example, that total expenditures are 200, divided equally
between the federal and state-local sectors, and that the federal gov-
ernment wishes to inaugurate a new incentive program for private
enterprise that is expected to cost 10. If it does this by means of
expenditure transfers financed, say, by new taxes of equal amount,
total government expenditures will rise to 210, assuming no fiscal
interactions between the new program and other federal expenditures
or state and local spending, and the shares of the two levels will change
from 50-50 to 52-48. Alternatively, the federal government might
establish tax credits of 10 for the relevant private groups and finance
them by additional taxes of 10 on other groups. Assuming again the
absence of fiscal interactions, we note that in this case the initial
expenditure share pattern of 50-50 would remain unchanged unless
we transferred the new tax credits to the other side of the budget and
included them with other expenditures.21
The problem with making adjustments of that sort, of course, would
power accorded the new entities and the extent to which they are responsible to
their electorates. If these distinctive qualities of government are lacking, the new
units may simply be parts of a more decentralized, higher level of government,
or they may be separate authorities with mixed public and private characteristics.
21Asimilar problem arises in the choice between measuring government
enterprise activities on a gross, or on a net, basis. If the former is selected, addi-
tional subsidies generated by lowering an enterprise's selling prices would not
affect governmental shares of total expenditures, whereas subsidies resulting from
spending more money in order to raise the quality of the enterprise's services
would. An advantage of the net basis of measurement is that the two policies
would have the same effects as long as their net costs to the enterprise were equal.
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be to identify the tax subsidies that should qualify for special treatment.
If the purpose of a specific tax favor were purely and simply to stimu-
late some private activity with social benefits, the answer would be
clear, but governmental actions are seldom that uncomplicated. The
point may be illustrated by considering a few of the relevant features
of the current federal tax system. The investment tax credit, which
was established to increase the growth, productivity and international
competitiveness of the U.S. economy, seems an obvious candidate for
inclusion in the measurement in total expenditure shares, but if this
is done, should not some portion of existing depreciation allowances
be treated in the same way on the grounds that Congress has made
them more generous than "true" depreciation for the same reason
that it established the investment credit? On the other hand, one cannot
be certain that the real purpose of the investment credit was not to
reduce effective corporate tax rates in a politically palatable manner,
or that accelerated depreciation is not intended mainly to offset the
effects of inflation on conventional measures of business taxable in-
come. Similarly, percentage depletion deductions may be regarded
either as means of stimulating activities that are important for the
national defense or as necessary adjustments to make the income tax
neutral among activities involving different degrees of risk, and chari-
table contribution deductions may be viewed either as stimulants of
socially desirable enterprises or as necessary expenses of earning
income.22
The necessary distinctions being unclear, it might be argued that
the best course of action is to ignore tax incentives in the measurement
of expenditure shares and to hope that they never become important
enough to matter. Unfortunately, it may already be too late to rest
very easy with such a solution, and the prospects seem to be that the
situation is likely to become worse, rather than better. In 1965—66 the
investment tax credit reached an annual level of over $2 billion, Pech-
man places the tax cost of excess depletion allowances above $1.5
billiona year,23 and charitablecontribution deductions probably
reduced individual tax burdens by about $2.5 billion in 1966.24 To-
22 For further discussion of these purposes see, for example, Joseph A. Pech-
man, Federal Tax Policy, Washington, D.C.,1966,pp. 124—25, and C. Harry
Kahn. Personal Deductions in the Federal income Tax, Princeton for NBER,
1960, pp. 13 and 46—48.
23 op.cit.,p. 124.
24 Taussig estimated that the cost of charitable deductions to the government
was over $2 billion in 1962, and in recent years total deductions have been grow-
ing at about 51,4 per cent a year. See Michael K. Taussig, "Economic Aspects of
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gether these tax incentives were slightly over 3 per cent of the direct
general expenditures of all levels of government in 1965—66, about 2.7
per cent of total NIA expenditures in 1966, and over 10 per cent of
the 1966 sum of NIA transfers, subsidies and the net current deficits
of government enterprises. As for future prospects, Senator Robert
F. Kennedy sponsored bills (S. 2088 and S. 2100) to encourage pri-
vate investment in industry and housing in urban poverty areas which
rely heavily on tax incentives to achieve their purposes, and the Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has recently adopted
a similar approach. The time may be fast approaching when more
meaningful measures of government subsidies than we now have will
be required.25
Post-Vietnam Governmental Roles
The single event with the greatest potential of changing the roles of the
different levels of government in a short period of time would undoubt-
edly be the end of the Vietnam War, or at least of any major U.S.
role init.Special Vietnam expenditures are currently projected at
$26.3 billion in fiscal 1969.26 Though this whole sum would not be
available for reallocation during the first postwar year, full-employ-
ment federal tax revenues are currently rising automatically by $10
billion a year or more,2T and the federal government would clearly
be in a position to make major changes in nondefense expenditures
and tax revenues. What concerns us here are the potential effects on
federal and state-local expenditure shares. Ideally one would like to
compute these, for a limited number of policy alternatives that Con-
gress could be expected to consider seriously, from a comprehensive
econometric model that took full account of fiscal interactions, feed-
backs and differential time paths. Specification of that limited set of
alternatives, however, is not possible at this stage of the war, and that
being the case, it seems unnecessary to attempt more here than a few
the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions," National Tax
Journal, Vol. XX, March 1967, p.1, and U.S. Treasury Department, Internal
Revenue Service, Statistics of income, 1965: individual income Tax Returns,
Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 210.
25 For a recent discussion of the conceptual issues see Warren C. Robinson,
"What Is a Government Subsidy?" National Tax Journal, Vol. XX, March 1967,
pp. 86—92.
26 The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1969, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1968, p. 83.
27 Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress, February
1968, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 67.
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rough approximations of the impact effectsof the major policy
alternatives.
Official projections of federal NIA expenditures for fiscal 1969 have
been selected as the reference base for our calculations.28 If to these are
added projections of state and local expenditures from fiscal 1967 to
1969 at the same rate as those expenditures actually increased between
fiscal 1965 and 1967, the expenditure amounts and shares shown in
the first two columns of Table 13 are the result. Comparison of these
TABLE 13
PROJECTED AND HYPOTHETICAL FISCAL 1969 FEDERAL
AND STATE-LOCAL EXPENDITURE SHARES UNDER
ALTERNATIVE POST-VIETNAM FEDERAL
FISCAL POLICIES












Own-financed Fb 185.0 68 68 68 75 64 68
expenditures SL 86.5 32 32 32 25 36 32
Own-financed ex- F 106.2 55 60 60 68 54 60
penditures:
civil-I SL 86.5 45 40 40 32 46 40
Purchases of goods F 99.4 51 51 31 43 42 43
and services SL 97.0 49 49 69 57 58 57












SOURCE: See text for description of methods of derivation.
a Policy 1: nondefense purchases substituted for $25 billion of defense pur-
chases.
Policy 2: grants-in-aid to state and local governments substituted for $25 billion
of defense purchases.
2a: state-local marginal propensity to spend =1.
2b: state-local marginal propensity to spend =0.
Policy 3: defense purchases and federal taxes reduced by $25 billion.
Policy 4: transfer payments substituted for $25 billion of defense purchases.
b F =federalshare; SL =state-localshare.
28SpecialAnalyses of the United States Budget, Fiscal Year 1969, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1968, Special Analysis B, p. 22.
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with the 1966 shares given earlier in Table 2 shows that three of the
four series are unchanged and that the federal share of total purchases
of goods and services is projected to rise from 50 to 51 per cent during
the period.
While the precise content of the preferred post-Vietnam policy
package cannot now be foreseen, it seems highly likely that it will be
a blend both of federal tax reduction, particularly since the special
"wartime" surtax has been enacted, and of expenditure increases for
nondefense purchases, grants-in-aid to state and local governments,
and transfer payments. The potential impacts of these four types of
postwar fiscal policy on federal and state-local expenditure shares will
accordingly be discussed in turn. For convenience it is assumed that
the change made in each case amounts to $25 billion a year, and only
the impact effects are shown in Table 13.
Suppose,first,that nondefense federal purchases of goods and
services were simply substituted for defense(i.e., Vietnam) pur-
chases.29 Because of the lower import content of the former, this sub-
stitution would probably have a net expansionary effect on aggregate
demand, and unless private demands were suitably sluggish, which
seems unlikely, would need to be supplemented with restrictive tax
and/or monetary policies. If the effects of the latter on state and local
expenditures are ignored, the shift from military to nondefense pur-
chases would affect only our two civil expenditure measures, increasing
the federal share of own-financed civil expenditures from 55 to 60
per cent and the federal share of civil purchases from 18 to 32 per
cent (Table
Our second policy alternative is a more complicated one. Federal
grants-in-aid have been growing rapidly in recent years, as Table 14
shows, and this behavior alone implies a preferred role for them in any
post-Vietnam federal policy package. In addition, there has been con-
siderable interest in new types of federal aid, including unconditional
Heller-Pechman grants and source-oriented income tax sharing, and
this interest can be expected to intensify whenever defense pressures
on the federal budget moderate to any significant degree. Policy alter-
native 2 in Table 13 is intended to cover both an increase in the
projected growth rate of existing functional grant programs and the
While some military expenditures fall in the transfer payment category, their
relative importance is slight. In 1966, for example, military purchases were 98
per cent of total military expenditures (Survey of Current Business, July 1967,
p. 29).
30Ineach case these changes result from a $25 billion increase in federal
expenditures above the amounts shown in the first column of Table 13. Note
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TABLE 14
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATESU OF FEDERAL
GRANTS-IN-AID TO STATE AND LOCAL

















SOURCES:Computedfrom datagiven inHistoricalStatistics: COG 1962, The
National Income andProductAccounts of the United States, 1929—1 965, Survey
of Current Business, February1968, and SpecialAnalyses, Budget of the United
Stales, Fiscal Year 1969.
a Rates are compound annual rates of growth expressed to the nearest ¾ per
cent for rates below 15 per cent and to thenearest 1 per centfor higher rates.
bBureauof the Census data used for 1902—13, 19 13—22, 1922—27, and 1927—36;
National Income Accounts data used for all other periods.
inaugurationof some new kind of federal aid. In each case the impact
effect on the federal budget would be a $25 billion increase in own-
financed civil expenditures and a $25 billion decrease in total purchases,
but no change in either total expenditures or in civil purchases.31
31Theonly problem arises in the case of source-oriented income tax sharing.
Ifthe amounts returned to the states of origin are treatedas federal aid,and
hence included on the expenditure side of the federal budget, the impacteffects
wouldbe those described in the text. Alternatively, the whole policymight be
treatedas a combination offederal tax reduction and an agreement by the fed-
eral government to collect an equal amount of income tax revenue for each of
thestates. In that case, total federalown-financed expenditures and purchases of
goodsand services wouldeach fall by $25 billion,and civil expenditures and
purchaseswould remain unchanged. The budgetary treatment assumed in the
text seemsthe preferable one.192 The Analysis of Public Output
The impact on state and local expenditures is more difficult to
specify, depending as it does on such things as the matching require-
ments in the functional grant programs that are expanded and the
average spending propensities of the states that happen to receive the
major share of any new unconditional grant or tax sharing program
that is initiated. In the face of these uncertainties, only two simple
alternatives are presented in Table 13: the first (Policy 2a) assuming
that state-local expenditures increase by the exact amount of the
additional federal aid,32 and the second (Policy 2b) making the admit-
tedly unrealistic assumption that state-local expenditures are unaf-
fected by the increment in federal aid and that state-local taxing and
borrowing operations are reduced accordingly. The second alternative,
therefore, consistently shows a higher federal expenditure share than
the first.
In general, the potential impact on federal expenditure shares of a.
substitution of federal aid for defense purchases may be summarized
as follows:
Federal Share Measure Predicted Impact on Federal Share (F)
Own-financed expenditures AF0 as state-local mpsa 1.
>
Own-financed civil expendituresF rises unless grants are strongly
stimulatory of state-local
expenditures.
Purchases of goods and services F falls.
Civil purchases 0 as state-local mps 0.
ampsmarginal propensity to spend.
The third policy shown in Table 13 combines $25 billion reductions
in defense purchases and federal tax revenues. Since it is assumed, as
a first approximation, that the impact of this policy on aggregate
demand is the same as those of the alternative policies being con-
sidered, the only effect on state and local expenditures will come from
a propensity on their part to raise their own tax rates as federal rates
fall. Here again it is difficult to be precise, and Table 13 simply uses
32 This means, of course, that state-local, own-financed expenditures would
remain unchanged. The increase in state-local purchases used for Policy 2a in
Table 13 ($23.5 billion) is based on the 1967 ratio of state-local purchases to
total expenditures (0.94).Changing Roles of Government 193
an arbitrarily small induced state-local expenditure increment of $5
billion to illustrate the point. It is clear, in any case, that state-local
shares would tend to rise at the expense of federal, though probably
not by large amounts for the two civil expenditure measures. An
interesting variant of a general tax reduction policy would be the
adoption by the federal government of a fractional credit for state
and local individual income taxes.33 Since each dollar of federal tax
revenue lost in this way would be expected to stimulate more state-
local expenditures than one lost through straight tax reduction, incor-
poration of the credit in Policy 3 would tend to raise state-local
expenditure shares above the levels shown in Table 13.
Our final post-Vietnam fiscal policy involves the substitution of
federal transfer payments for $25 billion of defense purchases. No
change would occur in the interlevel division of either own-financed
total expenditures or civil purchases, but the federal share of own-
financed civil expenditures would rise by 5 points and the federal
share of total purchases would fall by 8 points. One way of imple-
menting Policy 4 would be to enact a negative income tax, and in that
eventuality some of the most interesting effects would be the fiscal
interactions between the tax and both federal and state-local expendi-
tures on income-maintenance programs. Suppose, to take one possibil-
ity, that the negative income tax simply replaced all public welfare
expenditures. Projected to fiscal 1969 at their 1962—66 growth rate
of 8 per cent per annum, these would amount to almost $9 biffion,
and if fiscal 1966 financing arrangements remained unchanged, own-
financed welfare expenditures would be about $5 biffion for the
federal government and $4 billionfor thestate-localsector. A
negative tax plan with a gross cost of $30 billion to the federal gov-
ernment could consequently be enacted,34 and it would replace state-
local spending of $4 billion. The impact on expenditure shares, how-
ever, would not be great. In both of the own-financed series shown in
Table 13 the federal share would rise, and the state-local share fall,
by one point only, and the impact on the other two series would be
stillless since state-local welfare expenditures are currently about
one-third purchases and two-thirds transfers.
33Fora discussion of one such proposal see John Shannon, "A Partial Federal
Tax Credit for State Income Tax Payments," Proceedings of the Fifty-Ninth
(1966) Annual Conference on Taxation, Columbus, 1967, PP. 382—94.
34Foran analysis of alternative plans, together with rough estimates of their
costs, see James Tobin, Joseph A. Pechman, and Peter M. Mieszkowski, "Is a
Negative Income Tax Practical?" Yale Law Journal, Vol. 77, November 1967,
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If one were to predict, on the basis of the preceding discussion,
the direction in which post-Vietnam expenditure shares are likely to
move, it would be that the federal share of own-financed expenditures,
and also of civil purchases to a lesser extent, would rise, while the
relative federal use of the. nation's resources, as reflected in its share
of total governmental purchases of goods and services, would decline.
IV. Conclusions
From the many factors accounting for the changing roles of different
levels of government in this country during the present century this
paper has selected three sets for emphasis: (1) differential growth
rates among functions whose nature requires that their performance
be concentrated in the hands of one specific level of government, (2)
the increasingly wider geographical spread of the benefits of certain
programs that have traditionally been operated at state or local levels,
and (3) an upward shift of the financing function that has been only
partially a response to (2) and partly a result of greater revenue-
raising efficiency at higher levels of government together with man-
made restrictive barriers of one kind or another at the lower levels.
The main conclusions reached may be summarized as follows:
1. Though at the present time the federal government is clearly
the dominant partner in the U.S. federal system, its superiority shows
up mainly in the financing and other redistributive functions rather
than in the use of resources. Own-financed government expenditures
in 1966 were divided betweenthefederal and state-local
sectors, with the state and local levels being about equal in importance.
If expenditures are allocated to the level of operation, rather than of
financing, however, the federal share drops to 5 5—60 per cent, and
the local level becomes twice as important as the state. The greatest
contrast of all is between resource-using and redistributive expendi-
tures(transfers and subsidies),the former being shared equally
between the federal and state-local levels and the latter being over 90
per cent federal.
2. Those functions which by nature must be performed by the
federal government—defense, international relations, space research
and technology, veterans' benefits and postal services—have as a group
grown more rapidly during the present century than have the remain-
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ing nonfederal expenditure programs, though there have, of course,
been subperiods, such as 1902—27 and 1956—65, when the reverse
was true.
3. Expenditures for the maintenance and development of human
capital have also tended to have above-average growth rates. It is in
this area that the modern communications and transportation revolu-
tion has done most to spread the incidence of program benefits outward
from local to regional and national levels, and the changing roles of
government have reflected these forces to some extent, though not as
much as many experts would regard as desirable. Whereas in both
1902 and 1927 the federal and state governments made less than 20
per cent of the nation's direct expenditures on health, education and
welfare, by 1966 their share had risen to 35 per cent, of which state
governments contributed more than three-quarters.
4. Though urbanization has been a prominent feature of the present
century, those government functions whose per capita costsare
especially high in metropolitan areas—police, fire, sanitation, parks
and recreation, housing and urban renewal—have not grown as fast
as other local general expenditure programs. Large and growing needs
in the housing, recreation and waste disposal areas, however, may alter
this pattern in the future.
5. The upward movement of the governmental financing function
has tended to proceed in a series of fairly broad steps whose impact,
over the total period of time considered here, has been most impressive.
Whereas at the beginning of the century, for example, direct expendi-
tures were almost entirely financed by the governmental level that
made them, by 1966 the federal share of total own-financed govern-
mental expenditures was seven percentage points above its share of
total direct expenditures. During the same period federal aid rose from
%percent to nearly 17 per cent of state-local revenues, and state aid
increased from 6 per cent of local general revenues in 1902 and 1913
to 31 per cent in 1966.
6. Within the local level of government there are strong forces
making for the centralization of some functions and the decentraliza-
tion of others. One possible outcome, and one that should help main-
tain the vitality of the local sector, would be the development of
several distinct levels of local government, ranging from regional,
urban and rural, authorities down to autonomous neighborhood sub-
units of existing governments. In the absence of these structural changes
it seems likely that state and federal roles will increase at the expense
of local, at least for programs with significant benefit spillouts.
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7. A lively current interest in the use of tax credits to stimulate
private activities that have significant social benefits raises important
questions about the proper treatment of fiscal incentives in the measure-
ment of the roles of different levels of government. Unless the tax-
transfer system is treated as a unit, with the negative components
(taxes) being netted against the positive components (transfer pay-
ments), tax incentives, it is argued, should be explicitly added to the
expenditure side of the budget whenever quantitative comparisons,
over time or between levels of government in a given period, are to
be made.
8. Some of the sharpest changes in the roles of different levels of
government have occurred during and after wars. Though the Vietnam
War has not as yet caused a major break in past trends, it has had an
important impact on both the level and the intergovernmental distribu-
tion of civil expenditures. Its termination, consequently, is likely to be
followed by some significant changes in the U.S. federal system.
Though these are difficult to foresee in detail, the general prospect
seems to be for a greater federal role in financing and redistributive
functions and for more state participation in both the financing and
operation of public programs.
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Own-financed general ex- F 28.926.136.229.131.855.1
penditures for civil pur- S 12.613.515.318.322.819.4
poses: series P L 58.560.548.552.645.425.5
(0FGE: c-i)
Direct general expenditures F 28.325.534.627.729.648.7
for civil purposes: series S 9.5 10.7 12.9 13.8 17.8 14.9
IC (acE: c-i) L 62.263.752.558.552.636.4
Direct general expenditures F 18.5 19.8 20.8 16.5 18.438.8
for civil purposes: series S 10.811.514.716.020.717.8
lie (nos: c-is) L 70.768.764.567.560.943.4
Direct general expenditures F 11.611.225.517.016.638.6
for nonfederal pur- S 11.712.814.716.021.117.9
posese L 76.776.059.867.162.343.5
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. VI,
No. 4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment, and
Governmental Finances in 1964—65 and 1965-66.
a F =federal;S =state;L =local.
b For 1902 through 1962 local government expenditures were grouped by fiscal
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PERCENTAGE SHARES OF AGGREGATE




51.1 54.3 92.7 68.5 66.7 74.2 67.4 64.8 64.9 63.4 63.1
21.1 20.3 3.315.5 16.3 12.2 15.2 16.1 16.0 17.3 17.8
27.8 25.4 4.0 16.0 17.1 13.5 17.4 19.1 19.1 19.3 19.1
46.2 49.1 91.8 64.7 62.5 71.4 64.159.659.657.156.3
15.8 15.1 2.5 12.3 13.2 9.5 12.1 13.7 13.7 15.115.4
38.035.9 5.7 23.0 24.3 19.1 23.9 26.726.7 27.9 28.3
47.8 49.9 64.953.552.145.443.945.445.446.145.7
22.5 22.3 15.8 22.923.4 26.0 26.2 25.024.9 25.5 26.2
29.7 27.8 19.3 23.6 24.5 28.6 29.9 29.6 29.7 28.4 28.1









years ending within the calendar year specified. In 1963 a shift was made to a
fiscal-year basis, so that 1964—65, for example, refers to the expenditures of local
governments with fiscal years ending between July 1, 1964 and June 30, 1965.
No change was made in 1963 in the recording of either federal or state expendi-
tures, which have consistently been reported on a fiscal-year basis.
CFordefinitions of these series, see text.The Analysis of Public Output
TABLE B: FEDERAL AND STATE-LOCAL PERCENTAGE





Own-financed expenditures F 25.629.9
(oFE) SL 74.470.1
Purchases of goods and F 22.919.516.714.515.518.0
services (p) SL 77.180.583.385.584.582.0
Own-financed expenditures F
for civil purposes: series SL
Jb (0FE:c-I)
Civil purchases, series lb F
(p:c-x) SL
Transfer payments to per- F 76.065.0
sons (TPP) SL 24.035.0
Wages and salaries of gay- F-M 6.25.9
ernment employees F-C 22.021.3
(wsGE) SL 71.872.8
Number of full-time equiv- F-M 8.27.5
alent government em- F-C 17.817.4
ployees (FTEGE) SL 74.075.1
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, The
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929—1965; Survey
of Current Business, July 1967. Purchases of goods and services in 1902, 1913,
1922 and 1927 are unpublished special tabulations prepared for John W. Ken-
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SHARES OF SEVEN NATIONAL-INCOME-ACCOUNTS































































drick, Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton for NBER, 1961,
Table A-IIb.
aF=federal;SL =state-local;F.M =federalmilitary; F-C =federalcivilian.
bFordefinitions of these series, see text.
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TABLE C: PERCENTAGE SHARES, BY LEVEL OF











































































































Health and hospitals F
SL
SOURCES: U.S.Bureauof the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. VI,
No. 4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment, and
IChanging Roles of Government
GOVERNMENT, OF EXPENDITURES FOR THE
HUMAN CAPITAL, SELECTED YEARS,
1966
193619381940 194819501952 195619611962
7.9 6.1 6.7 30.3 25.6 13.3 6.6 3.0 2.6 4.5
12.6 13.1 13.3 14.0 14.1 15.6 15.1 17.9 18.721.7
79.5 80.8 80.0 55.760.3 71.1 78.3 79.1 78.773.8
17.1 13.3 12.0 2.1 0.8 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 3.0
42.3 36.740.1 44.9 52.8 49.8 50.448.448.845.0
40.650.047.9 53.046.448.7 48.250.450.052.0
21.1 18.7 16.8 36.4 35.5 31.7 25.9 28.1 29.229.3
37.3 39.541.0 43.3 34.9 35.4 39.3 36.2 35.235.5
41.641.742.2 29.3 29.632.9 34.8 35.7 35.635.2
12.2 9.9 9.6 26.222.6 15.0 9.3 7.2 7.2 8.4
23.823.4 24.7 22.925.3 25.8 24.725.8 26.227.3
64.0 66.7 65.7 50.952.259.2 66.067.0 66.664.3
14.2 10.3 12.7 35.7 29.4 17.9 10.4 7.9 8.1 13.1
85.8 89.787.3 64.3 70.6 82.1 89.692.1 91.986.9
46.1 31.0 31.8 35.9 39.043.2 47.246.848.854.4
53.969.0 68.2 64.1.61.0 56.8 52.853.251.245.6
20.8 39.3 35.9 30.8 32.033.2
79.2 60.7 64.1 69.268.066.8
Governmental Finances in 1965-66.
aF=federal;S =state;L =local;SL =state-local.
r
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TABLE D: AMOUNTS OF DIRECT GENERAL
GOVERNMENT ON SELECTED
(MILLIONS
SouRces: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. VI, No.
4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment, and Govern-














1. National defense and in-
ternational affairs 165250875616721 9321,041
2. Veterans' services not else-
where classified 1411774255799281,699 590
3. Postal service 126270553 711 794 751 776
4. Space research and tech-
nology ——— — — — —
5. Federalfunctions (total
1, 2, 3 arid4) 4326971,8531,9062,4433,3822,407
6. Nonfederal functions 1,1462,3257,0018,6849,30512,45513,866
7. Education 2585821,7132,2432,3252,3652,653
8. Public welfare 41 57 128 161445 9971,233
9. Health and hospitals 63 113352431 583 592 678
10. Human capital functions
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Purchases of goods and services
(NIA) 1.2 2.56.0 8.5 8.112.0
Direct general expenditures
(BOC), civil, series I 1.42.8 8.010.011.014.9
Nonfederal (BOC) 1.1 2.37.0 8.7 9.312.5
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. VI,
No. 4, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and Employment and
Governmental Finances in 1964—65 and 1965—66; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Business Economics, The National Income and Product Accounts of the
United States, 1929—1 965; Survey of Current Business, July 1967; and John W.


































Table A-IIb, Column 10, for purchases of goods and services, 1902, 1913, and
1922.
aFiscalyears for BOC series (see footnote b,
NIA series.
b 1927 for BOC series; 1929 for NIA series.
COwn.financedand direct general expenditures.
4 - J
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Purchases of goods and services
(NIA) 5.7 6.3 8.0 8.213.914.5
Direct general expenditures
(BOC): civil, series I 6.6 7.010.810.519.018.1
Nonfederal (BOC) 5.3 6.0 9.5 9.016.015.1
SOURCES: Table E and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Long Term Economic
Growth, 1960—1965, pp. 166—167, and Survey of Current Business, July 1967.
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1 16.415.3 9.911.313.1 11.012.815.615.415.815.7
bFiscalyears for BOC series (see footnote b, Table A); calendar years for
7. NIA series.
C1927for BOC series; 1929 for NIA series.
-JCOMMENT
by MA N CUR OLSON, University of Maryland
Professor Break has left us all in his debt with his interesting calcula-
tions, detailed breakdowns, and judicious recommendations about the
relative roles of different levels of governments. What else could we
ask for? Only a model or theory that could explain his interesting, F
and on occasion even somewhat paradoxical, conclusions. But Break
had no obligation to provide a logically complete explanation of his
findings and recommendations, especially as he has done quite enough
for a single paper. Yet, what he says does invite an attempt to provide
an explanatory model, so I will accordingly try to set out the broad and
rough outlines of such a model here. There is perhaps some evidence of
the need for an explanatory model in this area in the fact that two of
the other participants in this conference, Jerome Rothenberg1 and
Gordon Tullock,2 have independently attempted to provide explana-
tions of some of the same phenomena. In addition, a Canadian
economist with a particular interest in the process of federalism in
Canada has previously offered a model with partly similar purposes.3
What particularly needs systematic explanation in Break's paper
is the seemingly conflicting evidence about whether centralization or
decentralization is on the rise, and his own somewhat paradoxical
recommendation that there is a need not only for more centralization
but at the same time also more decentralization. Break shows that the
federal government's share of all government expenditures has in-
creased markedly in this century, to the point where the federal gov-
ernment is now "clearly the dominant partner in the federal system."
Where "redistributive" monies are at issue, Break finds that they are
"over 90 per cent federal." Nonetheless, Break's computations and
breakdowns also show that since 1948, by any one of a number of
NOTE. Some of the author's work on this topic has been supported by the
National Science Foundation under NSF Grant No. GS2588.
1JeromeRothenberg, "Local Decentralization and the Theory of Optimal
Government," in this volume.
2SeeTullock's "Comment" on Rothenberg's paper in this volume, and his
article on "Problems of Scale," in Public Choice, Vol. VI, Spring 1969, pp.
19—29.
Albert Breton, "A Theory of Government Grants," Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science, Vol. XXXI, May 1965, pp. 175—87.
AChanging Roles of Government 211
reasonable measures, both state and local expenditures have been
increasing more rapidly than federal expenditures. When the growth in
federal government spending on defense and international purposes is
excluded, this increase in the state-local share of total public expendi-
tures is particularly striking. Within the local level, says Break, "there
are strong forces making for the centralization of some functions and
the decentralization of others."
To add to the ambiguity, that most two-sided variable in any
analysis of changes in the relative importance of different levels of
government, grants-in-aid from higher to lower levels of government,
has increased disproportionately in the present century. At the turn of
the century, federal subsidies accounted for only 1,12ofone per cent
of state and local revenues, but by 1966 they accounted for nearly
17 per cent. Over the same period state aid increased from 6 per cent
to 31 per cent of local general revenues. In recent years, there has
been a particularly notable growth of state and local spending of
federal money; from 1957 to 1967, federal grants-in-aid to state and
local governments have increased at a compound rate of more than
14 per cent per annum.
There is both centralization and decentralization in Break's predic-
tions and recommendations as well. He says that "new levels of local
government are in the offing, promising to add further complexity to
the intergovernmental picture." One important possibilityisthat
"autonomous metropolitan and regional governments may be formed
either to help finance traditional units of government or to deal with
problems that transcend their boundaries, and the traditional entities
may also establish sets of subunits with some independent powers to
deal with programs generating benefits that are highly localized and
servicing groups with distinct and diverse tastes" (such as miniboards
of education and mini police stations in poorer areas of the big
cities). Some such amalgam of centralization and decentralization is
not only a probability, but desirable as well: "What seems to be
needed," he says, "is some magic blend of centralizing and decen-
tralizing changes thatwill create simultaneously both larger and
smaller units of local government...."
Thekey to explaining Break's seemingly ambiguous findings and
somewhat paradoxical recommendations can be found in the relation-
ship between the boundaries of a government or jurisdiction and the
distribution of the benefits of its activities. We shall assume that gov-
ernnients provide only collective or public goods, which in this par-212 The Analysis of Public Output
ticular argument are defined to be goods such that at least some non-
purchasers of these goods cannot be denied their benefits without
prohibitive costs. The phrase "at least some" isincluded in the
definition because it is here necessary to take account of one important
complication which many discussions of public goods ignore: the fact
that, in practice, a great many collective goods do not benefit all of
the people in the nation, or for that matter only people within a
nation. A program that lessens air pollution or water pollution, for
example, will benefit people in a particular metropolitan area or a
particular watershed, but not everyone in the country. Similarly, a
particular television station provides a collective good to the people
within the range of its broadcasting tower, but not to others. The
benefits of pure or basic research, by contrast,spill beyond the
boundaries of the government that pays for the research to the entire
world. Accordingly, the assumption here is that each collective good
has determinate beneficiaries, who may be a small group of citizens
in a single community or the citizens of the entire world. This determi-
nate client group may exactly coincide with those who live within the
boundaries of a given nation-state, but need not and usually will not
do so.
There are four logically possible relationships between the scope of
the benefits of a collective good and the boundaries of the jurisdiction
that provides it:
1. Some (or in rare cases even all) of the beneficiaries of a collec-
tive good live outside the boundaries of the jurisdiction that pro-
vides it;
2. All of the beneficiaries of a collective good are within the bound-
aries of the jurisdiction that provides it, but they comprise only
a subset (and often only a small subset) of those within the
jurisdiction;
3. Some of the beneficiaries of a collective good are outside the
boundaries of the jurisdiction, and those inside the jurisdiction
who enjoy its benefits are but a subset of those inside the jurisdic-
tion;
4. The scope of benefits of a collective good exactly matches the
boundaries of the jurisdiction that provides it.
We must now consider each of the logical possibilities in turn.
The case in which some (or even all) of the benefits of a collective
good reach beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction that provides it
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is simple and familiar. There is in this case an "externality" for the
jurisdiction that provides the collective good, and it ignores the bene-
fits that spill out beyond its borders, with the result that, from the
point of view of the society as a whole, only a less than Pareto-optimal
quantity (and conceivably none) of the collective good is supplied.
In addition, there is a tendency for the "exploitation of the great by
the that is, a tendency for those jurisdictions that put the
largest absolute value on any collective good shared by several juris-
dictions to bear a disproportional share of the burden of providing
whatever amount is provided.5 This case is typified in the metropolitan
• area enjoying many metropolis-wide collective goods, but containing
both a relatively large center city government and many relatively
small suburban jurisdictions. And the outcomes that at least many
observers find in such situations are exactly what the model predicts:
aless than optimal supply of public services for the metropolis, with
the center city government bearing a disproportionate share of those
• metropolitan services that are provided.
• The case in which the beneficiaries of a collective good all live
within the confines of the relevant jurisdiction, but comprise only a
subset (and often only a small subset) of the citizens of that jurisdic-
tion, is unfortunately not so familar. There is in this case an "inter-
nality" that parallels the "externality" in the preceding case. Unless
the subset of the citizens of the jurisdiction happen to be a majority
of those in the jurisdiction,6 it will follow (assuming majority rule)
that even a collective good that must be provided to attain Pareto-
optimality for the jurisdiction (and the larger society) will often not
be provided at all, or if it is, may not be provided in Pareto-optimal
quantities. Though the gains from a Pareto-optimal public project by
definition exceed itscosts, the number of losers from the project
exceeds the number of gainers, because the benefits reach only the
subset and the tax costs are borne by the population of the jurisdiction
as a whole.7 Here there is what might perhaps be called the "exploita-
tion of the few by the many."
The collective goods for a metropolitan area (such as air pollution
See my Logicof Collective Action,Cambridge, Mass.,1965, Chapter I.
See Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhouser, "An Economic Theory of
Alliances," ReviewofEconomics and Statistics, Vol. 48, August 1966, pp. 266—
79.
8 Inthis case there is no tendency for Less than Pareto-optimal provision.
If there is an institutional arrangement that imposes a special tax only on
the subset that benefits from the collective good, that arrangement constitutes a
jurisdiction and it fits under case four below.
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control, or an educational television station) will again provide an
instructive example. Why doesn't the federal government provide
such goods whenever it is Pareto-optimal to provide them? Because
the people in a metropolitan area will be the only gainers, and the
constituents of the congressmen and senators representing the rest
of the nation will be losers. It is commonly observed that bills need
to be written in such a way that the constituents of a great many
congressmen benefit before they are likely to pass. Legislation for
poor or depressed areas, for example, sometimes must be amended to
qualify so much of the nation's area for the benefits the bill provides
that the legislation's capacity to serve itsinitial purpose is lost or
impaired.
To be sure,itis not always the case that a small subset of the
people in a jurisdiction must fail to obtain a Pareto-optimal good.
Logrolling or bargaining among enough small groups with needs for
separate collective goods can, in principle, make it possible for them
to put together a package of individual projects which in the aggregate
commands a majority. But logrolling or bargaining is costly, and also
chancy because it can pay each party to the bargaining to "bluff" or
in other ways hold out for a better bargain. Thus bargaining is not
ordinarily feasible unless there are only a small number of groups who
need collective goods, and each of them is organized to bargain, and
together they constitute a majority. The "pork barrel" process that
gives "logrolling" its unfortunate and undeserved popular reputation
usually involves the special case of projects that have a "monumental"
quality that helps the congressmen who promoted them, and that are
all in the province of a single committee in each house, which deci-
sively lowers the cost of the needed bargaining.8 Thus the logical
possibility of bargaining cannot refute the conclusion that "inter-
nalities" normally lead to a less than Pareto-optimal provision of collec-
tive goods.9
In the third possible case, where there is both an externality and
an internality, it is obvious there is again a tendency to provision of
a less than Pareto-optimal quantity or collective good.
The only case in which there is no such tendency is that in which
I am thankful to my colleague Charles Schultze for calling this point to my
attention. He has told me of cases in which measures that could have left all
parties at issue better off were unable to pass because it was not feasible to logroll
across committee lines.
9Thispoint is justified with additional argument in my "Principle of 'Fiscal
Equivalence,'" American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. LIX,
May 1969, pp. 479—87.
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there is "fiscal equivalence," or matching boundaries of the collective
good and the jurisdiction that provides it. This case is the only one
consistent with the necessary conditions for Pareto-optimal resource
allocation.'0
The advantages of fiscal equivalence, and the total lack of a needed
public service that usually arises when the jurisdictional structure of a
society departs too far from this principle, may help explain why
Break felt that "new levels of local government are in the offing,"
even though there are already tens of thousands (according to the
Committee for Economic Development, 80,000)11 of local govern-
ments in the United States, and most expert observers think there
should be far fewer. The foregoing argument shows that there is a
case (albeit a case that is much qualified when all the detail and
diversity of the real world are taken into account) for a separate
jurisdiction for every collective good with a unique boundary, and
thus a need for a great number and variety of governments. Since
some collective goods cover the whole world, there is a case for a
comprehensive international organization, and since many cover only
small communities, there is also a case for a large number of local
governments, not to mention the governments in between. The fact
that even the different local or subnational collective goods a single
individual enjoys have different boundaries (e.g., the airshed which
gives the boundaries of the air pollution he wants controlled are usually
not the same as those of the watershed or other area that bounds his
water pollution problem) means that itis a necessary condition of
efficient resource allocation that at least many individuals should each
be subjecttoseveraldifferent"local" jurisdictions with varying
boundaries, offensive as such a state of affairs has been to those who
accept the conventional wisdom in these matters.
There is, to be sure, no need for each and every jurisdiction to have
a host of elected officials—in many cases the appropriate "jurisdic-
tion" is simply legal machinery whereby a higher level of government
can make it convenient for a group of citizens to tax themselves in order
to meet some local need. A federation of local governments, whose
10Governmentsare obviously concerned with stabilization and redistribution
as well as resource allocation. The rule of fiscal equivalence would give the fed-
eral government responsibility for stabilization policy, since a stable economy is
a collective good to the whole nation. The federal government should also have
responsibility for redistribution, since rich persons tend to move out of (and
poor people tend to move into) localities which redistribute income to the poor.
11Modernizing Local Government, NewYork, 1966, p.17.216 The Analysis of Public Output
boundaries together match those of a collective good, but which has
no direct elections of its own, can also satisfy the need for "fiscal
equivalence" without the costs of unnecessary officials and elections.
If the argument here is correct, there is a need not only for a larger
number of governments than expert opinion has thought fitting (though
perhaps not as many as the United States now has), but also for new
local and regional jurisdictions as metropolitan areas grow, the popula-
tion shifts, and technology changes. Even a new sense of ethnic
identity, if combined with demands for particular types of collective
goods not desired by others, can create a need for new jurisdictions.
This latter need will exist when historical patterns of segregation
or other factors have created ghettos, or enclaves inhabited exclu-
sively by one race or ethnic group. If the race or ethnic group in the
ghetto has a distinct cultural background and demands special collec-
tive goods'2 (such as more black policemen or courses in Afro-Ameri-
can history) the situation will then be analytically identical to a situa-
tion in which the people of a given area have some localized physical
problem, such as air pollution, which is a collective good for them
but not for those living outside the given area. The boundaries of the
ghetto, in other words, mark the boundaries of some potential or
actual collective goods, and the principle of fiscal equivalence then
demands a separate jurisdiction for the ghetto. This may help explain
Break's sympathy for mini police districts and school boards, as
well as many of the current demands for black power separatism, the
new left focus on decentralization, and the ideology of "power to the
neighborhoods."3 Of course, when long-run considerations are taken
into account, a solution which neglects the whole notion of "consumer
sovereignty," but rather tries to impose common public policies on
diverse social groups in the hopes that this will ultimately produce a
more cohesive and integrated society, may in some moral sense be
thought superior to fiscal equivalence for the inner city. But what-
ever policy is in practice preferred, it is important to remember that
separate jurisdictions with boundaries matching those of the ghetto
will sometimes be a necessary condition for Pareto-optimal efficiency
in the provision of public services in the short run.
Nothing that has been said so far explains Break's point about the
extraordinary growth in subsidies from higher to lower levels of gov-
12 See Nathan Glazer, "For White and Black, Community Control Is the
Issue," New York Times Magazine, April 27, 1969.
See Norman Mailer, "Why Are We in New York?" New York Times Maga-
zine, May 18, 1969.
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ernment. To obtain a proper understanding of this problem we need
to look not only at the "catchment areas" of collective goods, but also
at how the cost of production of these goods varies with the size of
the jurisdiction that provides them.
It is necessary, first, to be clear that economies of scale (as opposed
to diseconomies of scale) cannot lead to any modification of the prin-
ciple of fiscal equivalence. This is because, when all of those who
would benefit from a collective good are in the relevant jurisdiction,
as fiscal equivalence demands, there could be no point in expanding
the government still farther. Several jurisdictions might obtain savings
from purchasing needed goods or services from large contractors, per-
haps, but there could be no case for making a jurisdiction larger than
fiscal equivalence would suggest. This can best be seen by considering
the example of a dam built for flood control purposes. Fiscal equiva-
lence would require that all of the people in the flood plain be in the
relevant jurisdiction. There would be no point in adding others to the
jurisdiction, even if big dams should involve lower unit costs than
small ones.
Where there are diseconomies of scale, on the other hand, the
situation is more complicated. Suppose that, when the jurisdiction has
been expanded to the point that all the externalities have been inter-
nalized, it is so large and bureaucratic that it has higher unit costs of
production than a smaller government would have had. Education and
police services may be of this nature. In this case, maximum eco-
nomic efficiency requires a higher level jurisdiction encompassing all
of the externalities, and a lower level jurisdiction of whatever size
minimizes unit costs of production of the collective good. The lower
level jurisdiction should then produce the collective good, and the
higher level jurisdiction should give it a subsidy that lowers its marginal
costs (not a block grant) by the amount of the social value of the
benefits that spill out beyond the boundaries of the lower level juris-
diction. In this way fiscal equivalence is preserved and costs of produc-
tion are also at a minimum.
In view of the improvements of transportation and communication,
and the increasing mobility(including longer commuting) of the
population, the domains over which spillouts occur are probably
increasing over time. At the same time there may be a growing uneasi-
ness about the insensitivity and ineptness of bureaucracy, growing
demands for "democratic participation" via decentralization, and other
misgivings about theefficiency of large bureaucracies.'4 Thus the
14 See Glazer, op.cit.
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extraordinary growth in subsidies from higher to lower levels of gov-
ernment, which Break emphasizes, should not be either surprising or
alarming. A considerable number of such subsidies may be a necessary
condition of the Pareto-optimal provision of collective services, even
when jurisdictional boundaries are perfectly drawn. And as Albert
Breton's pioneering paper15 has shown, if the boundaries of local and
provincial governments are drawn in such a way that there are more
spillouts than would be the case with more rational boundaries, there
is a further need for subsidies from higher to lower levels of govern-
ment.
The real world is vastly more complicated than the unusually simple
model adumbrated here, so it is not appropriate to go directly from
the model to definite and specific policy recommendations. A com-
plete policy analysis would, for example, have to take account of the
fact that many governments provide quasi-private goods whose bene-
fit boundaries are ill defined or subject to change by policymakers, or
of the possible savings in certain cases of multifunctional govern-
ments.18
Yet what has been said here does strongly suggest that Break's
most basic recommendation deserves the most sympathetic considera-
tion. "What is needed," he says, "is some magic blend of centralizing
and decentralizing changes that will create both larger and smaller
units of local government." It is difficult indeed to see how a Pareto-
optimal provision of public services could be achieved without such a
blend of changes, or without the intragovemmental subsidies he rightly
emphasizes.
15 See Breton, op.cit.
18These and other complications and qualifications are discussed in Olson,
"'Fiscal Equivalence.'"
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